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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LAW OF NUISANCE THROUGH A
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CAPTIVITY
George P. Smith, II* & Matthew Saunig**
I. INTRODUCTION: COMING TO THE NUISANCE OR
BECOMING AN ECONOMIC CAPTIVE?
Ann and Conrad Riedi lived in the same rent-controlled
apartment in Manhattan for forty years.1 Despite this long-term
entrenchment, the Riedis and many of their neighbors are being
forced to move to make way for a new subway construction.2 Due to
their relatively low income and inability to pay typical Manhattan
rent because of their age and status as retirees, the Riedis may very
well be forced to relocate out of the neighborhood and out of a
borough in which they have lived most of their lives.3 The Riedis
have, in essence, become ―economic captive[s]‖ for, put simply, their
economic situation severely limits their choices as to where to
relocate.4 An economic captive, then, is someone whose housing
choices are determined detrimentally by his socio-economic status,
providing him with extremely limited options for places to live.5
Further, the housing available to an economic captive is often in
poor repair, in blighted and/or high crime areas, and far from the

* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University; LL.D. Indiana University.
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law. I acknowledge the
research assistance of Brian D. Concklin, Esq., on Section II of this article.
** B.A., University of Connecticut; J.D., The Catholic University of America School of Law.
1 Michael M. Grynbaum, Tenants Making Way for Subway Ask: You Want Me to Move
Where?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, at A17, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/
nyregion/08mta.html?sq=grynbaum.
2 Id.
3 Id. at A20. While there are other rent-controlled apartments in various other
neighborhoods in Manhattan, most of these units are already occupied. Id. As a result of this
move, the Riedis may also have to part ways with their dog, Biscuit, in order to find a suitable
place for them to live. Id. at A17.
4 The Theory of the Economic Captive is unique to Professor George Smith and was first
posited in 1995. George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 706 (1995).
5 See id.
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person‘s current neighborhood.6
The classical situation defining the forces of economic captivity is
illustrated when relocation by a landowner thereby subjects the
mover directly to a nuisance or a nuisance-like activity. For
example, acquisition of real property in an industrial area may
almost necessarily burden, significantly, the new owner with smog
or noise, while relocation to an agricultural community may subject
other homeowners to putrefying odors.7 If the economic captive
asserts a nuisance claim, the defendant may then raise an
affirmative defense that the plaintiff came to the nuisance; in other
words, the defendant and the injurious activity were established
prior to the plaintiff‘s arrival.8 Whether the plaintiff‘s status should
be considered a countervailing factor or argument to the defendant‘s
affirmative defense that the plaintiff actually came to the nuisance
is the central policy issue which must be resolved: specifically, the
manner in which society (be it governmental units or private
entities) deals with these inherent conflicts presented by a
recognized theory of economic captivity.
The phenomenon of the economic captive is a reality of modern
capitalistic society.9 Notwithstanding this reality, the question still

See id.; DANIEL R. MANDLKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 4.05, 4.08 (5th ed. 2003).
See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–06 (Ariz. 1972)
(finding that a feedlot for cattle was a nuisance to nearby homeowners because of the
obnoxious odors and flies); Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267–68 (N.D.
W. Va. 1982) (rejecting defendant steel corporation‘s coming to the nuisance defense against
claims that defendant created air pollution and discharged toxins into waterways); Wier‘s
Appeal, 74 Pa. 230 (1873) (granting injunction against the use of gun powder magazine on the
ground that it would be a nuisance to nearby residents despite the fact that the gun powder
was necessary for defendant‘s established business); see also Tal S. Grinblat, Offenses to the
Olfactory Senses and the Law of Nuisance, 21 LEGAL MED. Q. 1 (1997) (discussing the noxious
effects and putrid smells generated by large scale hog operations—e.g., fatigue, depression,
nausea, sleep disturbances, etc.—on populations downwind from these economically
productive hog farms, together with the availability of nuisance law to partially abate these
type of businesses). Aesthetics is also of growing concern in environmental nuisance cases.
See George P. Smith, II, & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach
to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 54–56 (1991).
8 Courts across America have held that the fact that a plaintiff came to the nuisance is not
a per se defense to a nuisance claim; however, many jurisdictions do consider ―coming to the
nuisance‖ as a factor in determining whether the defendant‘s activity is unreasonable. See
discussion infra Part I.B. Interestingly, by statute, several states have allowed a party
plaintiff to seek injunctive relief on a theory of anticipatory nuisance and, thus, abate an
action before it becomes a nuisance. See George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine of
Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005). Two other defenses available, in principle,
although not allowed often in practice by the courts, are to be found in contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B, C (1979)
(discussing contributory negligence and assumption of the risk); FOWLER V. HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 83 (1956).
9 See generally Manny Fernandez, Wary of a Wall Streeter at the Helm, N.Y. TIMES, May
6
7
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remains whether a person‘s socioeconomic status can serve as an
effective counter to the defense that the plaintiff came to the
nuisance. An examination into how the law should treat economic
captives whose presence in a location is inconsistent with a higher
use for the land will yield the answer to this question. Examining
the efficacy of a variety of approaches leads to the conclusion that
the best approach is through the working of managed growth and
bonus zoning in tandem in order to achieve some level of harmony
amongst a range of demographic groups.10 The employment of
amortization provisions, where the economic captive is allowed to
remain in his home for a reasonable period of time, is a necessary
component of this solution.11 Concluding that this approach is the
most efficacious leads to the determination that one‘s status as an
economic captive deserves to be included as a factor in the requisite
balancing under which a nuisance cause of action is tested
initially.12 However, such a status is not automatically dispositive
in dealing with a coming to the nuisance defense and must be
viewed in light of the desired goal of protecting the common good.13
The fact remains, importantly, that there is a place for the economic
captive and that individual is not left defenseless in the world of
nuisance law. If recognized, the plaintiffs‘ status as an economic
captive should offset, or at least neutralize, the fact that he came to
a nuisance and thereby provide him with an avenue for relief.
This article will begin with an analysis of nuisance law and its
purpose. At the heart of a nuisance action is a fact-specific
balancing of competing interests that this article will organize into
a general framework for nuisance inquiries. Furthermore, this
article will examine the affirmative defense of ―coming to the
nuisance‖ and what the appropriate application of such a defense
entails.
The evolving land use principle that mandates a balance, or ―fair

17,
2009,
at
A26,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/nyregion/
17housing.html?scp=1&sq=%27manny%20fernandez%22%20and%20helm&st=cse
(noting
that there are 402,000 people in New York City public housing).
10 See discussion infra Part V.B.
11 See discussion infra Part VI.D.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979). The Restatement states that
―[a]n intentional invasion of another‘s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is
unreasonable if . . . the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor‘s conduct.‖ Id.
13 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 715 (8th ed. 2011) (―[I]t
is to the benefit of all interest groups that when courts are enforcing common law principles
they should concentrate on trying to increase the aggregate wealth of society by making the
principles and case outcomes efficient.‖). Indeed, ―property rights are instrumental to
achieving economic efficiency.‖ Id. § 3.11.
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share,‖ of low and moderate income (i.e., affordable) properties in
any legal zoning plan14 will then be analyzed within the context of
its effect on recognition of a theory of economic captivity.15
Subsequently, the economic captive will be introduced through
description of examples of this economic captivity, ranging from a
socioeconomically homogenous inner-city enclave to a college
student with limited resources.
Thereafter, this article will
examine a variety of approaches for dealing with the relocation of
economic captives in light of their displacement. Through this
evaluation of efficacy, some amalgamation of solutions will yield the
ideal approach that should be taken toward the economic captive,
and a determination will be made as to exactly what role the notion
of economic captivity should play in contemporary nuisance law.
II. NUISANCE LAW AND COMING TO THE NUISANCE AS A
VALID DEFENSE
A. Ad Hoc Balancing Quantifies Reasonableness in Furtherance of
the Common Good
The basic definition of any nuisance is the ―unreasonable
interference with the . . . use and enjoyment of‖ one‘s real
property.16 When analyzing whether some action constitutes a
nuisance, most courts employ a balancing test.17 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts broadly provides that at the heart of the resolution
of a nuisance action is a balancing of the utility of certain conduct
with the gravity of its harm.18 In fact, in demonstrating that a
balance must be struck between a defendant‘s right to reasonably
use his property and the plaintiff‘s right to enjoy his property,
Prosser has stated that ―[these] two [rights] are correlative and
14 See discussion infra Part III. See generally John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable
Housing Obligation: The Mount Laurel Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365, 370 (2001).
15 See discussion infra Part IV.
16 Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Wis. 1967).
17 Smith, supra note 4, at 689.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979). The Restatement explains that the
calculation of the gravity of the harm employs an examination of the following:
(a) The extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of the harm involved; (c) the social
value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; (d) the suitability of
the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the
burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Id. § 827. Further, the utility of the good considers ―(a) the social value that the law attaches
to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the
locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.‖ Id. § 828.
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interdependent, and neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at the
expense of the other.‖19 This balancing of a defendant‘s rights and
the utility of the action with a plaintiff‘s rights and the harm
caused, serves as a judicial tool by which a court can establish
whether one‘s conduct was unreasonable, in which case a nuisance
would be found.20 The results of this balancing test are not uniform
irrespective of locality.21 Rather, what may be reasonable in one
area could be unreasonable in another.22
A nuisance can be either private or public.23 A private nuisance
occurs when one individual violates the maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas,24 and uses their land so as to injure another
individual or small group of individuals—the legal equivalent of

19 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (3d ed. 1964).
In
emphasizing the importance of a balancing test in nuisance actions, Prosser has stated:
The defendant‘s privilege of making a reasonable use of his own property for his own
benefit and conducting his affairs in his own way is no less important than the plaintiff‘s
right to use and enjoy his premises. The two are correlative and interdependent, and
neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at the expense of the other. Some balance must be
struck between the two. The plaintiff must be expected to endure some inconvenience
rather than curtail the defendant‘s freedom of action, and the defendant must so use his
own property that he causes no unreasonable harm to the plaintiff. The law of private
nuisance is very largely a series of adjustments to limit the reciprocal rights and
privileges of both. In every case the court must make a comparative evaluation of the
conflicting interests according to objective legal standards, and the gravity of the harm
to the plaintiff must be weighed against the utility of the defendant‘s conduct.
Id. at 616–17 (citations omitted).
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. c (1979) (―The question is not whether the
plaintiff or the defendant would regard the invasion as unreasonable, but whether reasonable
persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider
it unreasonable.‖); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1320 (2001) (―To classify a [use]
as a nuisance . . . invoke[s] a regime of reasonable accommodation between conflicting uses.‖).
21 See Smith, supra note 4, at 701; see also WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 170–71 (photo reprint 1982) (1954) (―There has been general recognition in
the nuisance cases that the relation of the activity to its surroundings is the controlling
factor.‖).
22 Smith, supra note 4, at 701; see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND
GRAY ON TORTS 97 (3d ed. 2006) (―It is the type of interest invaded that gives to the tort what
little unity or coherence it may have.‖). Common law jurisdictions choosing neither to accept
nor to follow the Restatement of Torts balancing test factors, have been faulted for
―balanc[ing] the competing interests as they see fit, considering only the ‗needs of justice‘
broadly defined.‖ Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in The Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L.
REV. 485, 525 (2010) (citing 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 78 (2008)). Neither definitive rules nor
normative principles exist which can clearly guide courts in determining those interests as
appropriate to evaluate when balancing actually occurs. Id. at 525. See also MANDLKER,
supra note 6, § 4.12.
23 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 60 (2d ed. 1956) (stating that
these two designations ―deserve[] separate consideration‖ from each other based on public
nuisance‘s protection of the general welfare and private nuisance‘s more individualistic
scope).
24 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 616 n.55 (―[U]se thine own so that thou dost no harm to
another.‖ (citation omitted)).
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unreasonableness.25 In contrast, a public nuisance occurs when
there has been an unreasonable interference with a group of
citizen‘s rights as a community.26 Often the difference is a matter of
degree and depends upon the number of individuals affected by the
nuisance.27
The utility of a nuisance cause of action is that it helps to
reinforce and preserve the common good through a codification of
what conduct a society deems to be a reasonable use of real property
in relation to the rights of others.28 The common good can be
described as achieving a social benefit that is greater than any
individual citizen‘s personal concerns.29 Stated otherwise, the
common good is the achievement of the greatest good for the
greatest number.30 It is through a balancing test that the courts
determine which use of property furthers the common good or, in
other words, which use is more reasonable.31
25 Smith, supra note 4, at 698–99. See Matthew Saunig, Rebranding Public Nuisance: City
of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. as a Failed Response to Economic Crisis,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 911 passim (2010) (analyzing the proper limits of public nuisance claims
and cautioning against unfettered expansions of the tort).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Public nuisance has been called ―a
species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the
community at large.‖ W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).
27 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–06 (Ariz. 1972).
28 Smith, supra note 4, at 699 (―[B]y its reasonable application, [nuisance] has sought to
effect a responsible, balanced approach to property use; an approach which seeks to
accommodate fundamental principles of utilitarianism with a functional recognition of
absolute property ownership—all guided as such by a standard of reasonableness effected by
application of a balancing test.‖).
29 Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special
Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 874–75 (2001) (noting that a community‘s values play an
important role in the calculus of the common good of that locale).
30 See John C. Duncan, Jr.,
Multicultural Participation in the Public Hearing Process:
Some Theoretical, Pragmatical, and Analeptical Considerations, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169,
216 n.216 (1999) (explaining that the common good draws its foundation from utilitarianism).
Utilitarianism ―focuses less directly on aggregation of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ and more on attainment
of greater societal ‗happiness,‘ exempt from societal ‗pain.‘‖ Id. According to the Supreme
Court, however, there may be very few limits on the common good as seemingly just about
anything goes with respect to the public purpose requirement for a Fifth Amendment takings
case. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (finding that economic
redevelopment constituted a valid public purpose and was sufficient justification for the
taking of property). However, in practice, the expanded definition of public purpose to include
economic redevelopment is not guaranteed to be successful. See Eric Gershon, Pfizer to Close
New
London
Headquarters,
HARTFORD
COURANT,
Nov.
9,
2009,
http://courant.com/business/hc-pfizer11100nov10,0766810.story (reporting that the Pfizer
plant, which was the focus of New London‘s redevelopment plan, was closing down and
relocating to another part of Connecticut).
31 Smith, supra note 4, at 680.
See also DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NUISANCE LAW 17 (1992) (―Economic analysis [not only
seeks to] determin[e] which allocation of scarce resources maximizes wealth [but] is generally
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Examining the common good through the lens of economics seems
to be an almost inescapable enterprise.32 The alternative is to place
social justice, manifested in a fair share approach to legal solutions,
as the main consideration for defining the common good.33 Yet,
economics and social justice are not necessarily two different and
distinct notions.34 The same efficiency that is a desired goal of an
economic approach also embodies elements of social justice.35
Engaging in such an ―economic analysis of the law‖ serves to
reinforce the common good through an attempt to maximize
society‘s aggregate wealth.36 It is clear then, that economics is
inevitably at the fulcrum of any balancing test that the courts must
employ when analyzing the merit of a nuisance claim. It follows
that the desired goal in resolving any nuisance claim is to permit
that use which will best help to maximize the common good37 or
economic viability.
B. Coming to the Nuisance: From Absolute Bar to But a Factor
1. Recognition of the Coming to the Nuisance Defense
Early common law, dating back to the Nineteenth Century,
recognized ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a valid defense to a nuisance
claim.38 The concept stemmed from the ancient maxim volenti non
fit injuiria, meaning ―no legal wrong is done to him who consents.‖39
In a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense, in which timing is the key, an
concerned with efficiency, not fairness.‖).
32 See generally POSNER, supra note 13, at 3–16 (explaining the role of economic
reasoning—especially rational choice and utility—as an undercurrent of legal decisionmaking).
33 See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 732
(N.J. 1975). (―We have earlier stated that a developing municipality‘s obligation to afford the
opportunity for decent and adequate low and moderate income housing extends at least to ‗. . .
the municipality‘s fair share of the present and prospective regional need[s].‘‖).
34 POSNER, supra note 13, at 26–27 (addressing criticisms of the economic approach to law
and explaining that economics inherently reinforces justice through its attempt to avoid
waste).
35 Id. at 35 (―Even the principle of unjust enrichment can be derived from the concept of
efficiency.‖).
36 Id. at 713–16. Such an approach is necessary in the absence of a world in which the
courts could effectively redistribute wealth throughout society to achieve the greatest level of
equity. Id. Posner states that the legislature is far better equipped at redistributing wealth
through income taxes and government programs than its judicial counterpart. Id. at 715.
37 See discussion supra notes 23–31.
38 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1952)
(citing Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (1826)); Wier‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 241 (1873); see
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 8.
39 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556.
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established resident who has been carrying on the complained of
activity for some time seeks favorable treatment over a new
inhabitant.40 It also entails a presumption that the plaintiff
understood and accepted the conditions of the area. For this reason,
―coming to the nuisance‖ could be likened to the defense of
assumption of the risk.41 An early case often cited as recognizing
―coming to nuisance‖ as an affirmative defense to a nuisance claim
is Rex v. Cross.42 In that case, an English court held that:
[i]f a certain noxious trade is already established in a place
remote from habitations and public roads, and persons
afterwards come and build houses within the reach of its
noxious effects; or if a public road be made so near to it that
the carrying on of the trade becomes a nuisance to the
persons using the road; in those cases the party would be
entitled to continue his trade, because his trade was legal
before the erection of the houses in the one case, and the
making of the road in the other.43
As that court‘s holding illustrates, early common law favored
established inhabitants based upon the principle that the plaintiff
consented to the conduct by moving into the area wherein the
complained of activity was already taking place.44
2. Repudiation of Coming to the Nuisance as a Per Se Defense
In response to the growth of industrialization and the shift
towards urbanization during the Nineteenth Century, courts began
refusing to recognize ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a per se defense in
nuisance actions.45 Many courts found that the concept of ―coming
to the nuisance‖ was contrary to public policy and the common
good.46 Allowing such a defense, it was found, allowed a property
owner to control the use of the surrounding areas not within his

58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 426 (2011).
Id.
42 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556 (citing Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. Rep.
219 (1826)).
43 Rex v. Cross, 172 Eng. 219, 219 (1826).
44 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 556.
45 See Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (―The
majority view [of jurisdictions] rejects the doctrine of coming to the nuisance as an absolute
defense.‖ (quoting Lawrence v. E. Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955))).
46 See id.; United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 387 (D. Del. 1905) (stating that recognizing
coming to the nuisance as a defense ―would be so unreasonable and oppressive as to work its
own condemnation‖).
40
41
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ownership.47 Additionally, courts were facing plaintiffs with limited
housing options, such as persons moving into overcrowded cities
bustling with industrial work.48
Consequently, courts began
protecting citizens and their dwellings over established businesses.
An example of this shift is the 1873 case heard before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Wier’s Appeal, in which several
residents in a growing borough outside of Pittsburgh brought a
private nuisance action seeking an injunction to prevent Wier from
building and maintaining a gun powder storage building on his
property.49 In upholding the injunction, the court stated ―[c]arrying
on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from
buildings and public roads, does not entitle the owner to continue it
in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in
the neighborhood.‖50 Further clarifying the court‘s response to
societal changes, the court continued, ―[a]s the city extends, such
nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the
immediate neighborhood of the residences of the citizens. This,
public policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of
the city, demand.‖51 As the Wier case illustrates, the expansion of
cities and industrialization helped spur a shift in the minds of
judges that lead to protecting private dwellings, even at the cost of
established businesses.52
Although courts began refusing to
recognize coming to the nuisance as a per se defense, not all
completely ignored the timing of events, nor do they today.53

47 Luce, 141 F. at 389. See Smith, supra note 4, at 704–05, for analysis of an action for
anticipatory nuisance; MANDLKER, supra note 6, § 4.03.
48 Patrick, 549 F. Supp. at 1267.
49 Wier‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 231 (1873).
50 Id. at 241.
51 Id.
52 See id.; Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Mich. 1948) (granting an injunction
against operator of dog breeding and boarding business due to odors and flies despite the fact
that the plaintiffs moved into the area after the creation of the business); Carter v. Lake City
Baseball Club, Inc., 62 S.E.2d 470, 471, 478 (S.C. 1950) (enjoining the use of school baseball
field by professional team because it caused a nuisance to nearby homeowners and noting
that it is no defense that the plaintiff voluntarily moved into the vicinity); Lawrence v. E.
Airlines, Inc. 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955) (stating in nuisance action against airline
company that ―it is no defense to an action of this character that the plaintiff ‗came to the
nuisance‘‖).
53 See, e.g., Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 129 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1942)
(dismissing action for injunction against concrete plant because defendant‘s business was well
established, the plaintiff knew the conditions of the property he purchased, and because the
defendant‘s business was an integral part of the community); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio,
Annotation, “Coming to Nuisance” as a Defense or Estoppel, 42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972).
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3. Current Stance: Coming to the Nuisance as a Factor in
Determining Reasonableness
As observed, at the heart of any nuisance action is reasonableness
and currently, although it is not a per se defense, most jurisdictions
do consider whether a plaintiff came to the nuisance as a factor in
the ultimate determination of reasonable use.54 When taking into
account ―coming to the nuisance,‖ it must first be established that
the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions
of the area before acquiring the property.55 A plaintiff can have
constructive knowledge if he knew ―‗information [that] would lead a
prudent man to believe that the fact existed, and that if followed by
inquiry must bring knowledge of the fact home to him.‘‖56 Without
the requisite knowledge, it cannot be said that a plaintiff
voluntarily came to the nuisance. Although such a plaintiff or
economic captive may have knowledge of the surrounding property,
thus allowing a court to consider ―coming to the nuisance‖ as a
factor, other considerations may weigh in favor of the economic
captive.57
When considering coming to the nuisance as a factor in
determining reasonableness, several sub-factors can also affect the
weight of the coming to the nuisance defense.58
The first
consideration is often the general use of the location wherein the
nuisance-like activity is taking place.59 It is critical whether the
54 See, e.g., Ensign, 34 N.W.2d at 553; Abdella v. Smith, 149 N.W.2d 537 (Wis. 1967) (―A
plaintiff, of course, is not ipso facto barred from relief in the courts merely because of ‗coming
to the nuisance,‘ but it is a factor.‖); Tinio, supra note 53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
840D (1979).
55 See, e.g., Powell, 129 P.2d at 537–38 (denying injunction against cement business in part
because the plaintiff knew of the conditions caused by the plant); Mark v. Oregon, 84 P.3d
155, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that coming to the nuisance is only a consideration if the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the complained of activity before moving onto the
property).
56 Mark, 84 P.3d at 163 (quoting Tucker v. Constable, 19 P. 13 (Or. 1888)). In affirming an
injunction preventing the use of a nude beach, the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Mark v.
Oregon refused to consider the fact that the plaintiffs came to the nuisance as a factor
because the defendant could not establish that the plaintiffs knew or should have know that
the nude beach was next to their property. Mark, 84 P.3d at 157, 163. This was because the
plaintiffs only visited the area during the winter months when no sunbathers were present,
no maps or signs in the area indicated that it was a nude beach, and the seller never
indicated that the adjacent property was a nude beach. See id. at 158.
57 See Spur Indus., Inc., v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972).
58 Id.; see Tinio, supra note 53.
59 See, e.g., Powell, 129 P.2d at 537 (noting that at least half of the residents of the town
depended upon the defendant‘s cement business, whose location was necessary because of its
proximity to a limestone deposit); see also E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246
P.2d 554, 563–64 (Or. 1952) (holding private party could not obtain damages based on
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plaintiff is complaining of conditions typical of industrial activities
in a well-established industrial neighborhood60 or agricultural
regularities in a farming region.61 A plaintiff will have a more
difficult time overcoming the ―coming to the nuisance‖ factor if, for
instance, the area is zoned for uses other than personal dwellings.62
This is because courts have favored ―industrial operators who are a
part of a long-established and recognized industrial center, wherein
the area is dominated by manufacturing enterprises.‖63 Therefore,
an economic captive has a stronger case if the area in which he lives
has some dwellings and is not used exclusively for industry or
agriculture.
Another sub-factor vital to a court‘s consideration of a coming to
the nuisance defense is public policy, which in many instances will
weigh heavily in favor of an economic captive.64 As one court has
stated, ―[t]he law recognizes that the nuisance claims of private
owners must at times yield to public interest and convenience[,]‖
while at other times an established business must yield to the needs
of the public.65 For instance, an established business may need to
move or cease operations if a city extends and houses are built in
the area.66 Alternatively, public policy may favor a long standing
business because of its role to the community.67 Such was the
finding in Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, where the Supreme
Court of Washington refused to grant damages to a homeowner
despite smoke, gas, and noise because roughly half of the town‘s
livelihood was tied to the cement plant.68 To an economic captive,
public policy could be a significant consideration against a ―coming
nuisance, in part because the area in which the plaintiff purchased the land was a wellestablished industrial district); Abdella, 149 N.W.2d at 541 (stating that one reason the
defendant‘s use of his property as a horse riding academy was reasonable was because it was
in a rural area).
60 See E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 563.
61 See Abdella, 149 N.W.2d at 541.
62 See Weir‘s Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 238–39 (1873).
63 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 560.
64 Cf. Wier’s Appeal, 74 Pa. at 230; Yaffe v. City of Fort Smith, 10 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Ark.
1928); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 702 (Ariz. 1972).
65 E. St. Johns Shingle Co., 246 P.2d at 562.
66 Wier’s Appeal, 74 Pa. at 236, 237.
67 Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 129 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1942).
68 Id. at 537. More contemporaneous with the decision in Powell is the landmark case of
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In Boomer, although the New
York Court of Appeals found that dust, smoke, and vibration emanating from a cement plant
constituted a continuing and recurrent nuisance, no injunctive relief was ordered to be given
to the plaintiffs; rather, permanent damages were assessed. Id. at 871, 875. The court
reasoned that significant economic consequences would result to the local and state economies
if it issued a prohibiting injunction. Id. at 871.
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to the nuisance‖ defense.69 Although an economic captive has
limited housing options, he should have the same rights as others to
enjoy his property.70 For instance, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia noted in a 1982 case that the
defense of ―coming to the nuisance‖ was ―‗out of place in modern
society where people often have no real choices as to whether or not
they will reside in an area adulterated by air pollution.‘‖71 For this
reason, public policy dictates that limited options and financial
hardship should not require a homeowner to endure unreasonable
living conditions.
Factors other than public policy and location can also play a role
in a court‘s consideration of the fact that a plaintiff came to the
nuisance. These include whether the complained of activity has
increased or changed.72 Although a plaintiff may knowingly move
into the vicinity of a nuisance, that plaintiff should not have to
suffer the consequences of increased noise, pollution, or other
nuisance like conditions.73 An additional factor often analyzed by
courts when considering ―coming to the nuisance,‖ is the price the
plaintiff paid for the property.74 If a plaintiff is able to purchase the
property at a much lower rate, knowing the price was cheaper
because of the complained activity, a court is more likely to place
greater weight on a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense.75 However,
an economic captive is not comparable to a business that can choose
to purchase cheap property in an effort to obtain maximum profits.76
An economic captive, by definition, has few choices, and as such
should not be penalized for selecting property because of its price.77
Because most courts are currently considering ―coming to the
nuisance‖ as a factor in determining reasonableness, an economic
captive should raise these other factors, in addition to public policy
Cf. Powell, 129 P.2d at 538–39.
See Smith, supra note 4, at 706.
71 Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (quoting
Lawrence v. E. Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955)).
72 See, e.g., E. St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 554, 563–64 (Or.
1952) (noting that the ―coming to the nuisance‖ doctrine did apply, in part, because the
complained of activity was not increased beyond what should have been anticipated).
73 See id. at 564.
74 See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (noting
that it was not unfair to require the plaintiff to indemnify the defendant because the plaintiff
was able to purchase cheaper and larger tracts of land). See also Rohan Pitchford &
Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete
Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 491, 492 (2003).
75 See Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 708.
76 See id. at 704.
77 See Smith, supra note 4, at 706.
69
70
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concerns, the nature of the area, and the plaintiff‘s knowledge of the
conditions. It is only after addressing all factors that a court can
truly determine reasonableness.
III. THE SPUR INDUSTRIES APPROACH TO COMING TO THE
NUISANCE: EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMPENSATED INJUNCTION
In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., Spur Industries
owned a cattle farm in an area of Arizona in which farming had
begun in roughly 1911.78 Spur‘s cattle farm was started in 1956 and
by 1959 Spur had erected feedlots for approximately 7,500 cattle.79
In 1960, Del Webb began advertising a housing development that he
was building, roughly two and one-half miles north of the Spur
feedlot area.80 At the time of this marketing of the Del Webb
property, Del Webb did not consider the Spur feedlot area‘s odors to
be a problem and, in fact, continued to develop further and further
south, getting closer and closer to the Spur property.81 However, as
Del Webb expansion continued pushing south, there became a
significant sales resistance that made it nearly impossible to sell
the proposed housing lots.82 Del Webb then sued Spur Industries
asserting that the operation of Spur‘s feedlots constituted a public
nuisance because it rendered portions of Del Webb‘s property unfit
for development, thereby making it impossible to sell any
residential units.83 In addition to their inability to sell residential
units, Del Webb‘s public nuisance allegation was bolstered by the
complaints of residents who had already purchased homes from the
developer about various odorous emissions and secondary effects
emanating from Spur‘s feedlot.84
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that
despite the fact that the operation was a lawful business, Spur‘s
Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 703–04.
Id. at 704.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 705. Del Webb‘s complaint cited ―the flies and the odor which were drifting or
being blown by the prevailing south to north wind over the southern portion of Sun City‖ as
the alleged nuisance-like activity that the continued operation of Spur‘s feedlot was causing.
Id. at 705. The Supreme Court of Arizona found,
[t]here [was] no doubt that some of the citizens of Sun City were unable to enjoy the
outdoor living which Del Webb had advertised and that Del Webb was faced with sales
resistance from prospective purchasers as well as strong and persistent complaints from
the people who had purchased homes in that area.
Id.
84 Id.
78
79

04 GEORGESMITH

70

2/10/2012 10:39 AM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 75.1

continued operation of its feedlots was indeed a public nuisance to
the already established residents of the nearby community.85 So far
as the court was concerned, there was no doubt that the residents
did have an actionable claim to abate Spur‘s business operations
with respect to the feedlot in question.86 This was because the odors
and flies caused by the feedlots prevented the residents from
lawfully enjoying the use of their property.87
The inquiry then turned to the validity of Del Webb‘s nuisance
claim arising from the loss of sales and Spur Industries‘ defense
that Del Webb came to the nuisance.88 The court expressed that
Spur‘s coming to the nuisance defense to Del Webb‘s nuisance claim
was not falling on deaf ears when it noted that ―[i]n addition to
protecting the public interest, however, courts of equity are
concerned with protecting the operator of a lawfully, albeit noxious,
business from the result of a knowing and willful encroachment by
others near his business.‖89 Had Del Webb been the only injured
party, the court stated that it would ―feel justified‖ in ruling that
Spur Industries had an adequate coming to the nuisance defense, a
factor that would have ultimately resulted in a finding that Spur‘s
use was reasonable.90 The court, however, acknowledged the
important role that changing circumstances played in the case at
bar.91 More specifically, the court noted that a lawful business in a
remote location may become surrounded by a growing population, in
which case the ―elastic‖ nature of nuisance law a court must
determine what is fair and reasonable for the interests of the
public.92
Citing the needs of the general public which was
increasingly populating the expanding city, the court granted the
injunction requiring Spur Industries to move its feedlot.93
This injunction, however, did not relieve Del Webb of any
Id. at 706.
Id.
87 Id. at 705.
88 Id. at 706–07.
89 Id. at 706.
90 Id. at 706–07.
91 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: Teaching Regulatory
Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 724 (2002) (noting that changing
circumstances may transform a once reasonable land use into a nuisance). The court
explained that Spur had ―no indication . . . that a new city would spring up, full-blown,
alongside the feeding operation and that the developer of that city would ask the court to
order Spur to move because of the new city.‖ Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 707–08.
92 Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 707 (quoting Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E.
371, 373 (Mass. 1914)).
93 Spur Indus., Inc., at 708 (recognizing that the injunction was being granted through no
fault of Spur‘s).
85
86
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responsibility to Spur Industries.94 According to the court it did
―not equitably or legally follow . . . that Webb, being entitled to the
injunction, is then free of any liability to Spur if Webb has in fact
been the cause of the damage Spur has sustained.‖95 The court
noted that Del Webb voluntarily purchased land that was remote
from current urban establishments, primarily used for agriculture,
and was not protected by urban zoning.96 Moreover, the court found
that the feedlots were a foreseeable nuisance for the lots Del Webb
was trying to sell.97 Noting principles of equity at play in the case,
the Supreme Court of Arizona required Del Webb to compensate
Spur for their forced move of the feedlot.98 The court stated,
[i]t does not seem harsh to require a developer, who has
taken advantage of the lesser land values in a rural area as
well as the availability of large tracts of land on which to
build and develop . . . to indemnify those who are forced to
leave as a result.99
Thus the court found against Spur Industries while also requiring
Del Webb to indemnify Spur Industries for the damages sustained
in relocating the feedlot.100
The court‘s granting of this compensated injunction reflects the
current trend that coming to the nuisance, while a factor to
consider, is not an absolute bar to a nuisance claim.101 As the court
stated, its decision was ―not because of any wrongdoing on the part
of Spur, but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the courts
for the rights and interests of the public,‖ which outweighed Spur
Industries‘ interests because of the encroaching growing
population.102
The compensated injunction employed in Spur
Industries, Inc. is a viable tool in the judicial arsenal especially
when, as the Arizona Supreme Court made clear, both the general
public and the offending landowner are innocent but the offending
use clearly constitutes a nuisance.103
Id.
Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Of Time and Feedlots: The Effect of Spur Industries on
Nuisance Law, 41 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75, 88–89 (1992). Such a trend is
particularly efficacious ―if a plaintiff is part of a natural wave of growth and development that
has gradually approached a defendant‘s formerly harmless use.‖ Id. (citations omitted).
102 Spur Indus., Inc., 494 P.2d at 708.
103 Reynolds, supra note 101, at 99.
However, the compensated injunction has been
94
95
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IV. MOUNT LAUREL AND THE FAIR SHARE PRINCIPLE: A
SEPARATE, YET RELATED, CONSIDERATION
In 1975 in South Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel I), the Supreme Court of New Jersey was
faced with the question of whether a developing municipality could
enact zoning regulations, which made it extremely difficult for low
and moderate income residents to reside in the town.104 In response
to an increasing suburbanization sweeping across southern New
Jersey, the town enacted a zoning ordinance that gave more than
enough space for potential industry and business development while
severely limiting the potential for residential development.105 For
those zones in which residential development was allowed to occur,
the ordinance was clearly geared towards upper and middle income
prospective residents by permitting only single-family homes
situated on large lots.106 In striking down Mount Laurel‘s zoning
ordinance as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
explicitly adopted the provision that a municipality must ―make
realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing‖
including low and moderate income housing.107 The court focused
on each municipality‘s greater regional responsibility, to permit
housing for a ―fair share‖ of the region‘s need for housing for the
various demographics.108
Other jurisdictions have also
acknowledged the fair share principle with respect to a
municipality‘s duty to afford a reasonable opportunity for a
reasonable number of low and moderate income people to reside in
that area.109
applied sparingly. See Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning
Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
147, 184, n.194 (2002) (commenting that it is highly unlikely for a court to employ a
compensated injunction).
104 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
[hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
105 Id. at 718–19. The court explained that ―much more land has been so zoned than the
reasonable potential for industrial movement or expansion warrants‖ and that this land
cannot be used for residential purposes according to the ordinance. Id. at 719.
106 Id. at 721.
107 Id. at 724 (holding that there must be some affirmative effort on the part of the
municipality to provide for housing opportunities to a variety of socioeconomic groups).
108 See id. at 726–27. In noting the need for better regional development, it was explained
that ―‗effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the
adventitious location of municipal boundaries‘‖ and the modern trend of greater
suburbanization ―‗refuses to be governed by such artificial lines.‘‖ Id. (quoting Duffcon
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949)).
109 See, e.g., BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Millcreek Twp., 633 A.2d 144, 146 (Pa.
1993). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held that ―[w]here a municipal
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The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed one significant
concern with the fair share doctrine: the extent to which such a
requirement of a municipality restricts that municipality‘s ability to
provide quality government services and foster economic growth.110
Providing a reasonable opportunity for affordable housing for
various segments of society should not serve as an impediment for
municipalities to ―become and remain attractive, viable
communities providing good living and adequate services for all
their residents in the kind of atmosphere which a democracy and
free institutions demand.‖111 It is important to note that in order to
actually realize such a result in the face of fair share obligations,
the court pointed toward active government planning and
cooperation.112 The court stopped short, in Mount Laurel I, of
actually providing any clues of how governments can comply with
such an obligation.113 Rather, the court vaguely pointed to a
cooperative effort to achieve the desired goal of social equity—a
reasonable affordance of housing opportunities for all economic
classes of people.114
Eight years later, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), the Supreme Court of
New Jersey developed a template to clarify the broad directive of its
earlier decision.115 Mount Laurel II arose as a result of substantial
municipal noncompliance with the fair share doctrine previously
discussed.116 Imposition of the fair share obligation, the court
determined, should only affect those localities deemed to be ―growth
areas‖ by the state‘s development plan.117 Through its reliance on
subdivision is a logical place for development to occur, it must assume its rightful part of the
burdens associated with development, neither isolating itself nor ignoring the housing needs
of the larger region.‖ Id. (citations omitted). Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm‘n of Town of
Milford, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (Conn. 1954) (holding that approval of a subdivision cannot be
denied on the basis that that subdivision will impose a financial burden on the town).
110 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 733–34.
111 Id. at 733.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 734.
114 Id. The court noted that a coalition of ―private builders, various kinds of associations,
or, for public housing, by special agencies created for that purpose at various levels of
government‖ should work together in furtherance of this objective. Id.
115 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 413 (N.J. 1983)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel II] (―Although [Mount Laurel I] set forth important guidelines for
implementing the doctrine, their application to particular cases was complex, and the
resolution of many questions left uncertain.‖).
116 Id. at 410.
117 See id. at 424 (making this determination in accord with public policy considerations).
The court accepted the proposition that the state‘s development plan was an accurate
reflection of where growth was expected to occur in the state. Id. at 426. The goal of this
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the state development plan, the court sought to impose the fair
share obligation in a manner consistent with the state‘s desires
while avoiding irrational development.118 In seeking to resolve the
great difficulty in calculating what fair share actually meant,119 the
court suggested the creation of a judicial body that would serve as
an administrative tribunal to determine and enforce the fair share
obligation.120 It was intended that this body would, through the
resolution of a few initial cases, establish a pattern that would
create consistent expectations for each region, and the state as a
whole.121 Further, a formula was suggested that would take into
account a variety of factors when determining a locality‘s fair share
obligation.122 The court suggested that affirmative measures such
as subsidies and inclusionary zoning devices were necessary to
effectuate the desired goal.123 Judicial remedies were also discussed
in the event of a failure of a locality to meet its fair share
obligations.124 While Mount Laurel I failed to produce concrete
guidelines for achieving the fair share aspirations, Mount Laurel II
succeeded—and was vilified as a result.125
Following Mount Laurel II‘s directives, the New Jersey legislature
enacted the Fair Housing Act126 that established an agency, as
opposed to a judicial body,127 to determine regional housing needs
and whether the fair share obligation was met.128 The agency, the
determination was ―to channel the entire prospective lower income housing need in New
Jersey into ‗growth areas.‘‖ Id. at 433.
118 Id. at 435.
119 Id. at 436 (noting that it was ―[t]he most troublesome issue‖ and ―takes the most time,
produces the greatest variety of opinions, and engenders doubt as to the meaning and wisdom
of [Mount Laurel I]‖).
120 See id. at 438.
This judicial body consisted of three judges, each responsible for
determining and enforcing the fair share obligation in a particular part of the state. Id. at
439.
121 Id. at 439.
122 Id. at 440–41 (suggesting that the regional factors (e.g., employment opportunities and
other factors already employed in the state for determining water and sewer fair shares)
should be given more weight than those pertaining to any particular municipality).
123 See id. at 442–48 (commenting that governments should take a proactive approach in
providing for affordable housing).
124 See generally id. at 452–58 (suggesting that a builder‘s remedy, use of a special master,
judicial revision of a town‘s zoning ordinance, and further judicial orders in the event that
revised zoning still fails to satisfy the town‘s fair share obligation).
125 John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable
Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 22 (1987) (explaining that even ―the Governor of New
Jersey equated Mount Laurel [II] with communism‖).
126 DAVID J. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE 551 (5th ed. 2008).
127 See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 444.
128 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329 (West 2011) (establishing a
statutory system in which low and moderate income housing planning is realized with respect
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New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, in turn provides policies
with respect to what local governments can do to create realistic
housing opportunities as well as review demographic distribution
plans submitted by municipalities.129 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey addressed this statute‘s validity in light of their previous
jurisprudence in what would come to be known as Mount Laurel
III.130 In upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act,
the court noted that the legislation‘s effects were in line with its
previous Mount Laurel rulings.131 Furthermore, the court expressed
its preference for legislative rather than judicial resolution of the
fair share question.132 However, complete judicial deference was not
granted as the court exhibited a dedication to enforce the fair share
obligation in the event the Fair Housing Act failed to do so.133 The
presumption of the Act‘s constitutionality would only be overcome if
it were almost certain to fail to achieve the Mount Laurel
objectives.134 The court, thus, accepted the legislature‘s revision of
the Mount Laurel II template.
A reasonable opportunity for a variety of classes of people is not
an unattainable summit. The reasonableness limitation on a
municipality‘s responsibilities helps to prevent situations in which

to regional needs). This legislation was passed only after the public outcry over Mount Laurel
II abated. See CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 551; Payne, supra note 14,
at 367 (citing N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329).
129 Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An
Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268,
1271 (1997) (citing N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 52:27D-307 et seq.). Political interests and, indeed,
constraints have obfuscated the work of the Council and limited its achievements and overall
effectiveness. Matthew Rao, Fair Share in Practice: The Council on Affordable Housing and
the Mount Laurel Doctrine 26 (Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.planningpa.org/se_scholarships_fair_share.pdf.
130 Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 631 (N.J. 1986) (citing Mount Laurel
II, 456 A.2d 390, 439 (N.J. 1983); Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)).
131 Hills Dev. Co., 510 A.2d at 640.
The court stated that the Fair Housing Act
―addresse[d] the main needs delineated in our prior decisions on this matter, namely, the
consistency on a statewide basis of the determination of regional need, fair share, and the
adequacy of the municipal measures.‖ Id.
132 Id. at 634 (holding that, until the legislature takes action, it is the duty of the courts to
enforce the constitution).
133 Id. at 633. In a case determined in 2009 by a New Jersey court, it was held that even
though a township not only met but exceeded their fair share of affordable housing, the
township‘s land use planning board must nonetheless give requests for additional low income
housing review and consideration of the fulfillment of certain variance criteria. See Homes of
Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128, 1128, 1131 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
134 Hills Dev. Co., 510 A.2d at 643 (―The judiciary must assume, if the assumption is at all
reasonable, that the Act will function well and fully satisfy the Mount Laurel obligation.‖).
See also supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussing the fair share objectives of
Mount Laurel I).
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there is an underwhelming demand for affordable housing in a
particular municipality.135 In examining the appropriate fate of the
economic captive, the answer as to the correct path for
municipalities in the aftermath of the Mount Laurel cases can also
be extracted. In fact, the solution of some combination of managed
growth and bonus zoning in tandem with amortization provisions
not only takes care of the economic captive, but also relieves the
Mount Laurel albatross from the necks of municipalities.136
Affordable housing is provided in accordance with a plan that will
maximize the economic benefits to a locality; therefore, achieving a
balance between opportunities for an economic captive and desired
economic growth.
V. THE PLIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC CAPTIVE
The economic captive, first recognized by Smith in 1995, is an
individual who due to a limited economic status is forced to live in a
particular area.137 The aspects of the location, which prompt the
economic captive to call such a place home, share one common
thread—economic necessity.138 Such exigencies include proximity to
a place of employment, government-mandated rent-control, and
cultural necessity, but this list is not exhaustive.139 In fact, all that
is required for one to be considered an economic captive is that he
must live in an area for socioeconomic reasons and have little choice
in the matter due to financial, personal, or other social reasons. 140
The following discussion of examples of economic captives will
highlight three possible classes of people upon whom this
designation could be bestowed. Understanding the nature of the
economic captive‘s situation will enable a more complete analysis of

135 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 803 A.2d 53, 85 (N.J. 2002). In expressing that a
municipality need only provide affordable housing opportunities in relation to demand, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that ―developers are motivated by profit, and there is
likely no greater area of concern for a developer than the marketability of its project. The
colloquial phrase ‗if you build it, they will come‘ does not translate well to the building of
homes.‖ Id.
136 See discussion infra Part V.B. and Part V.C.; cf. Katrin C. Rowan, Anti-Exclusionary
Zoning in Pennsylvania: A Weapon for Developers, a Loss for Low-Income Pennsylvanians, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 1271, 1304 (2007) (―By focusing on property rights rather than people and their
need to live in decent, affordable housing, Pennsylvania‘s ‗fair share‘ case law removes the
focus from low- and moderate-income Pennsylvanians and instead places power in the hands
of developers, who generally do not have a profit incentive to build affordable housing.‖).
137 Smith, supra note 4, at 706.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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what role the concept of economic captivity should have with respect
to nuisance law.
A. Mr. and Mrs. Riedi Meet Wilhelmina: Elderly Exigencies
The previously discussed case of Ann and Conrad Riedi provides
but one example of economic captives.141 As observed, despite the
fact that the elderly couple has lived in the same apartment for
forty years, the Riedis are faced with the choice of having to relocate
to allow for new subway construction.142 The Riedis are economic
captives in the sense that, because of their limited resources, age,
and government rent control policy, they are confined not only to
that part of the city, but to that particular building.143 Their
situation does not exist in isolation. In the landmark takings case
Kelo v. City of New London,144 a corollary may be found to the
Riedis‘ situation. One of the landowners who challenged the taking
of her property in the name of economic redevelopment was
Wilhelmina Dery, an elderly resident.145 Wilhelmina lived in her
house for her entire life and her husband had lived there with her
for roughly sixty years.146 As was the case with the Riedis, the only
reason Wilhelmina was being forced to move was because her house
stood in the way of a development project; blight was not an
issue.147
See Grynbaum, supra note 1.
Id.
143 Id.
144 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New
London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 203 (2006) (―[Kelo] is a
case of reductio ad absurdum, meaning that its premise is flawed in that it deems almost
everything to be a ‗public use.‘‖); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A
Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751 (2009).
145 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
146 Id.
147 Id. On June 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the New York State
Urban Development Corporation had exercised—properly—its power of eminent domain on
behalf of Columbia University‘s plan for a $6.3 billion expansion in West Harlem. Kaur v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E. 721 (N.Y. 2010). A crucial seventeen acres of private
property were blocking this expansion of the University, which would not only upgrade the
―blighted‖ neighborhood by construction of a civic project which would be dedicated to
research and expansion of laboratories, libraries, and student housing, but would also create
some 6,000 permanent jobs which, in turn, would make contributions to a better society in
biotechnology and in health research. Id. at 724–26, 729. The Appellate Division had
determined previously, by a three-to-two decision, that the power of eminent domain had
been ultra vires and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 729. But see Alexander D. Racketa, Takings
for Economic Development in New York: A Constitutional Slam Dunk?, 20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL‘Y 191, 197 (2010). Racketa questions the implicit recognition by the New York
Court of Appeals of economic development as a valid public use under the eminent domain
power of the state constitution and calls upon the Court to not only constrain the expansion of
141
142
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The situations of Wilhelmina and the Riedis highlight a
circumstance that will become more and more frequent with an
ever-increasing elderly population in this country.148 Many of these
people can be described as having a modest income.149 As such, this
elderly segment of the population will have a severely limited choice
in terms of where to live. Proximity to medical care, government
services, and safety are very real considerations that warrant the
need for an elderly economic captive to reside in a certain area.150
Once relocated to an area that meets these specific criteria, an
elderly economic captive should not be forced to endure nuisancelike conditions.151
B. An Economic Captive with Cultural Needs to Boot
There may also be other social underpinnings, in addition to
economic needs, that account for an economic captive‘s decision to
live in a particular locale. In Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch,
a proposed development project in Manhattan would have displaced
residents of New York City‘s Chinatown district.152 At the time of
the case, New York City had the largest Chinese community in
America.153 The area of the proposed redevelopment was described
as a ―major housing resource for the relatively recent immigrant
families, the future immigrant families, those families who came . . .

this notion but to also define, with care, the boundaries of ―blight‖ in seeking its removal as
advancement of a public purpose. Id. Generally, when a taking adds significant wealth to
society, courts will sustain it as being valid. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 108 (1986). Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, in his
dissent in Kelo, cited a South Carolina takings case, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, in support
of his contention that when slums exist and are ―blighted,‖ nuisance law should be seen as
controlling over an exercise of the eminent domain power. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519–20 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992)). The power
to abate a nuisance requires no compensation. See id. Arguably, blighted areas could be
considered aesthetic nuisances. See generally George P. Smith, II, Aesthetic Nuisance:
Reeducating the Judiciary, 24 REAL EST. L.J. 26 (1995) (arguing for a new standard which
courts should implicate when recognizing aesthetic nuisances).
148 WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 813 (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf (noting that the elderly
population in the United States ―is projected to double between 2000 and 2030.‖).
149 Id. at 101 (noting that the median income for a household in which the householder was
75 or over was $29,280 in 2003). Also, in 2003, 10.2% of the population over age 65 lived in
poverty. Id.
150 See Ana Petrovic, The Elderly Facing Gentrification: Neglect, Invisibility, Entrapment,
and Loss, 15 ELDER L.J. 533, 549–50 (2007).
151 Id. at 542.
152 Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
153 Id. at 953 (noting that the city was expected to receive another 150,000 to 200,000
Chinese immigrants by 1980).
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long ago, but remain at the bottom of the economic ladder, and a
small group of middle-income professionals and business
persons.‖154 Also, many residents of this area fell below the poverty
line.155 In addition to the economic necessity of living in this area,
there were also important cultural reasons that made it almost
imperative for these qualified economic captives to live in
Chinatown.
Residing in this particular neighborhood was
instrumental in the assimilation process for Chinese immigrants
and there were employment opportunities in Chinese-owned
business that were in close proximity to the economic captives‘
homes.156
The case of an economically-dependent person, with additional
cultural needs that bind him to a particular area of residence, adds
another complication to the plight of the economic captive. If some
weight is to be given to one‘s economic situation when analyzing the
viability of a ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense, should cultural
exigencies factor into the analysis as well? There is actually an
economic efficiency argument that weighs in favor of consideration
of an economic captive‘s cultural needs.157 That argument holds
that the quicker an immigrant population assimilates into United
States society, the sooner that population can contribute to the
economy and do so at a more productive rate than would result if
assimilation took longer.158 The socioeconomic implications that
attach to the economic captive who is also an immigrant warrant
consideration in the nuisance calculus. A denial of its operative
validity would result in both social and economic disharmonies.
C. Learning Lessons of Hardship: The Collegiate Economic Captive
The example of a college student as an economic captive was first
expressed in the initial pronouncement of the theory.159 Under such
an example, a college student without the means to afford
university housing must live in off-campus residences in order to

Id.
Id. (noting that the percentage of immigrants with socioeconomic restraints ranged
from twenty to thirty-three percent of the population).
156 Id. A study of the area concluded that ―[p]roblems of assimilation for new immigrants
are minimized by the absence of language and cultural barriers and the opportunities for
employment from Chinese-owned businesses within walking distance from their homes.‖ Id.
157 Cf. POSNER, supra note 13, at 715 (explaining that society‘s end-game should be wealth
maximization).
158 See Asian Ams., 514 N.Y.S.2d at 953–54.
159 See Smith, supra note 4, at 706.
154
155
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pursue the furtherance of their education.160 However, the offcampus housing could very well be ―in a very poor, dilapidated
housing unit in the inner city that is, however, within walking
distance of the campus.‖161 The question becomes whether this
economic captive with a collegiate permutation has any standing to
bring a nuisance action against the conditions that their status, as a
student of a particular university, theoretically required them to
move to. In such a case, the defendant may argue, and a court may
consider as a factor, that the economic captive came to the nuisance.
Once again, an economic justification can be found for affording this
economic captive some recourse against the ―coming to the
nuisance‖ defense they would surely face. While post-secondary
education has a plethora of social values, it also furthers economic
utility through the creation of a more intelligent and skilled
workforce that breeds entrepreneurism.162 Given the utility of
college attendance, it would be counterproductive to discourage the
pursuit of higher education by ignoring a student‘s status as an
economic captive when sorting through the nuisance calculus.
VI. SOLUTIONS: EFFICACIES AND FLAWS
A. The Federal Approach: The Uniform Relocation Act
In the event that an individual‘s property is taken for some
government initiative—consistent with Fifth Amendment powers—
―just compensation‖ is required.163 The federal government has
provided its own mechanism for the compilation of just
compensation for people who are displaced as a result of a federal
agency‘s taking of their property.164 In such an event of a taking,
the taking agency is required to pay the ―actual reasonable
expenses in moving [the displaced person], his family, business,
farm operation, or other personal property.‖165 The displaced person

Id.
Id.
162 See Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress’s Power to Authorize the
States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903, 952 (1992).
163 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and
Federally Assisted Programs (Uniform Relocation Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–55 (2011).
165 Id. § 4622(a)(1). For the purposes of the federal solution, ―displaced person‖ refers to:
(i) any person who moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real
property—
(I) as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of
such real property in whole or in part for a program or project undertaken by a
160
161
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should be relocated into a comparable living situation.166 The
justification behind such a federally-funded relocation assistance
program is founded in concerns with equity and fairness.167 This
relocation legislation was intended ―to minimize the hardship of
displacement on such persons.‖168 Additional compensation is
afforded for any additional reasonable costs of relocation ―not in
excess of $22,500.‖169 Replacement housing costs for displaced
tenants are also considered in the federal statute.170
The federal approach to dealing with the relocation of displaced
persons as a result of a government taking does have an admirable
purpose that seemingly falls in line with the underlying notion of
fairness that is required of governments.171 This approach is
founded on the notion that the displaced person is being put in a
Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.
Id. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I).
166 See id. § 4623. ―Comparable replacement dwelling‖ is statutorily defined as:
[A]ny dwelling that is (A) decent, safe, and sanitary; (B) adequate in size to accommodate
the occupants; (C) within the financial means of the displaced person; (D) functionally
equivalent; (E) in an area not subject to unreasonable adverse environmental conditions;
and (F) in a location generally not less desirable than the location of the displaced
person‘s dwelling with respect to public utilities, facilities, services, and the displaced
person‘s place of employment.
Id. § 4601(10).
167 Id. § 4621(b).
168 Id.
169 Id. § 4623(a)(1). Additional reasonable costs could include title searches, recording fees,
closing costs, and any debt service costs. Id. § 4623(a)(1)(C).
170 See id. § 4624. For tenants, the additional reasonable relocation expense provision
covers amounts not in excess of $5,250. Id. § 4624(a).
171 See discussion supra Part IV. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that a community could be condemned in order to allow the
General Motors Corporation to build a factory. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459–60 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). Even though the condemnation meant some 1,300 homes, 140
businesses, six churches and one hospital were demolished, the court reasoned that eminent
domain seizures of this nature served only to safeguard the common good by revitalizing, and
thus sustaining, the economic foundations of the municipality and the state as well. Id. The
same state supreme court ruled on July 30, 2004, that the Poletown precedent was to be
discarded. Accordingly, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the court held that economic
development was an insufficient reason for justifying the condemnation of private property.
Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783, 787 (Mich. 2004). Interestingly, Hathcock
does not support complete private to private condemnations. See Ilya Somin, Overcoming
Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of
Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1027–28 (2004). Indeed, Hathcock recognizes three
exceptions to the ban on private-to-private transfers and compounds uncertainty in its
application of failing to explain adequately how these three tests are to be employed
prospectively. See James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 859, 863–64 (2004). The Michigan Supreme Court permits transfers to private parties if
(i) the public retains control over the property, (ii) the condemnation was for a public
necessity, or (iii) the condemnation was for a purpose separate from the transfer to the
private party, such as blight removal. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d at 781–83.
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comparable housing situation and that the compensation for such
relocation is just. Similarities exist between this approach and the
compensated injunction of Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co.172 As is the case with a compensated injunction,
the federal government is seeking to provide for the mitigation of
harm to virtually innocent landowners while at the same time
acknowledging a higher use of the property is in society‘s best
interest and should be allowed to displace the current use.173 The
burden of compensation is placed on the invading party, in this
case, the government. Furthermore, compensation of reasonable
additional expenses is a valiant attempt to impose no further
displacement costs on the person being forced to relocate.
Ultimately, the most redeeming quality of the federal relocation
assistance program is that it seeks to achieve a compromise
between competing interests.174 Implicit in the statute is the
recognition that there are certain governmental needs the
fulfillments of which are highly beneficial to society. At the same
time, an attempt is made to make the relocated persons whole at
the conclusion of the ordeal by trying to minimize the difference
between the old residence and the one relocated to.
Admirable as these goals may be, there are inherent flaws in the
federal approach that make it untenable with respect to the
economic captive. While an attempt is made to relocate the
displaced person to a place of comparable characteristics, such
action may be impracticable for the economic captive. Consider the

172 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). See discussion
supra Part II.B.2. There are also similarities with efforts to rebuild localities after they have
been decimated by a natural disaster. See Terry L. Clower, Economic Applications in
Disaster Research, Mitigation, and Planning 6 (on file with Albany Law Review) (noting
―surprisingly liberal attitudes . . . toward[] disaster relief.‖). However, many disfavor
rebuilding disaster areas with taxpayer dollars. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, IRC
Study Finds Strong Support for Government Policies to Mitigate Damage from Natural
Disasters Before They Happen But Also Finds Lack of Personal Preparation 2, Aug. 31, 2006,
http://208.84.250.9/irc/news/20060831.pdf (showing that roughly sixty percent of people do not
support using tax dollars to subsidize disaster insurance). It may be better to compensate
displaced people for their losses instead of rebuilding their homes in the same high-risk area.
In fact, ―the usual lesson from economics is that people are better off if they are given money
and allowed to make their own decisions, much as they are with car insurance.‖ Edward L.
Glaeser, Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, Or Just Give Residents Checks?, 2
THE ECONOMISTS‘ VOICE 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss4/art4.
The underlying consideration for such an approach is a cost-benefit analysis which shows that
rebuilding homes destroyed by natural disasters is too costly a proposition. Id. at 5.
173 See discussion supra Part III.
174 The utility of such a goal can be witnessed through the discussion of the undeniable
need for the employment of a balancing test in nuisance actions. See discussion supra Part
II.A.
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case of the Riedis‘ as an archetypical situation that thwarts the
purpose of the statute.
The federal government sought to
implement the provisions of the aforementioned statute to facilitate
the Riedis‘ move to another locale, in order to make way for a
Manhattan subway development.175 The government-sponsored
real estate agent charged with facilitating the move to comparable
housing suggested that the couple relocate to an area of Manhattan
that faces a busy intersection at the entrance to a bridge.176 This
relocation alternative proved to be untenable for people in the
Riedis‘ situation as the busy intersection is unsafe for the elderly.177
The only other alternative suggested to them, based on their
housing needs, financial situation, and the scarcity of housing in
Manhattan, was to move out of Manhattan and into another
borough of the city.178 The Riedis‘ situation belies a major failing of
the federal approach with respect to economic captives—the unique
socioeconomic position of the economic captive may make finding
comparable housing alternatives within close proximity to their
former residence impossible. This may move the economic captive
outside of the small radius that their unique socio-economic status
requires them to reside in. The aftermath of such a move could very
likely feature an increasing incompatibility of uses of land if the
economic captive is moved to an area ill-suited for their needs.179
Refusing to weigh the economic captive‘s socioeconomic situation
against the ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense in resulting nuisance
actions would create an inequitable exacerbation of a status quo in
which the economic captive becomes an increasingly marginalized
member of society. In order to give acknowledgment that economic
captives should be included in societal considerations, legal
significance must be given to their socioeconomic status.
B. Local Government Responses
1. The District of Columbia
A dramatic, contemporary illustration of economic captivity—and
a laudable effort, by the government, to deal with the pernicious
effects of it—is found in the distribution of federal stimulus
Grynbaum, supra note 1, at A17.
Id. at A20.
177 Id. (discussing the Riedis‘ refusal to relocate to this proposed location).
178 Id.
179 Id. at A17, A20 (explaining that in the relocation search, the government‘s idea of
equivalent housing is not the same as the residents‘ idea of equivalent housing).
175
176
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(―TARP‖) monies.180 Specifically, in December 2009, approximately
$7.5 million dollars from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development‘s ―Homelessness Prevention and Rapid ReHousing‖ Program was given to the District of Columbia
government.181
This disbursement was designated to assist families—for up to
eighteen months—with subsidy payments for property rental
arrangements and payment of utility bills past due.182 Designed as
―a new tool that allows the city to help low-income people [e.g.,
captives], who would otherwise become homeless,‖183 the program
recognizes and, in a very real way, validates the theory of economic
captivity. Impoverished individuals are essentially provided with
an economic incentive, in the form of grant monies, to remain in
their housing units and thereby, ideally, stabilize and improve their
neighborhoods and forestall homelessness.184 As well, by these
grants, the government is recognizing that it has a responsibility to
maintain a standard of living—albeit meager to be sure—for those
unfortunate citizens who do not have the economic freedom to seek
better housing and are thus relegated to the status of economic
captives.
2. New York City
As a consequence of the popularity of suburbanization, which
reached its zenith at the end of World War II, major U.S. cities lost
a significant amount of their populations and soon became
concentrated heavily with the urban poor.185 Even with current
efforts to promote new forms of revitalized urbanization through
―Smart Growth‖ policies, the expenses of poverty in the inner cities
of America remain a significant, if not staggering, concern to
municipal governments.186
Indeed, redistributing clusters of
180 TARP is an acronym for the ―Troubled Assets Relief Program.‖
See Gary Lawson,
Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 55, 57 (2010).
181 Darryl Fears, $7.5 Million to Keep a Roof Over Their Heads, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2009,
at B10. But see Lawson, supra note 180. Lawson argues that the President‘s executive
powers do not constitutionally include a power to take any course of action that the executive
thinks is important for the country, regardless of congressional inactions or lack of statutory
basis. Id.
182 Id. See Debbie Cenziper, infra note 191.
183 Fears, supra note 181, at B10.
184 Id.
See discussion infra Part VI.D. (discussing grandfathering and amortization as
methods to confront the plight of the economic captive).
185 Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of
Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 9–10 (1995).
186 Id.
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poverty regionally and out of the inner city cores has become, since
Mount Laurel I was decided in New Jersey in 1975,187 a national
fixation.188
In 1979, New York City owned some 8,950 buildings which
provided 110,000 housing units.189
In 2010, the city owned
approximately 190 buildings.190 During the period of time from
1979 to 2010, the city sought—by divesture—to take 100,000
slumlord units and convert them into 100,000 rehabilitated ones,
which in turn, served as catalysts for redevelopment of ten
neighborhoods throughout the city.191 Approximately 442 of the
rehabilitated buildings are delinquent in their payment of
municipal tax assessments and utilities.192 A total debt of $140
million is owed, collectively, on these buildings—with nearly half of
this amount being levied on a per unit debt of $3,000.193
Clustered principally in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, the South
Bronx, and Harlem, these originally rehabilitated buildings are now
populated by poor residents and are owned either by private or nonprofit associations overseeing building management.194 Because of
this socioeconomic demographic in occupancy level, the building
owners have ―razor-thin margins to operate on.‖195 This situation is

Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
See Poindexter, supra note 185, at 37–38. It has been suggested, however, that a
contemporary model for municipal growth relies upon a central assumption, namely, ―that a
city‘s economic development is really a competition for mobile taxpayers.‖ Richard C.
Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 311, 338 (2010). Accordingly, a city should not develop policies that are concerned
exclusively with the well being of current residents.
189 Cara Buckley, Rescued from Blight, Falling Back Into Decay, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2010,
at A18.
190 Id.
191 Id.
The practical difficulties confronting other large American cities—such as
Charlotte, North Carolina—in finding affordable housing through housing rental units and
houses for the poor, are often compounded by issues of financial mismanagement of Home
Fund grant monies from the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)—a fund set aside purposely for low income assistance housing. This conduct, in turn,
has resulted in significant loss of expected housing opportunities for the poor which will now
be exacerbated by recent Congressional budget cuts to HUD. Debbie Cenziper, Amid Need, A
Push to Review Projects, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2011, at 1. See also Michael Cooper, Tough
Choice for Cities as Federal Aid Shrinks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at A19 (highlighting the
plight of Allentown, Pennsylvania).
192 Buckly, supra note 189 at A15.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. See also Mary Marsh Zulack, If You Prompt Them, They Will Rule: The Warranty of
Habitability Meets New Court Information Systems, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 425, 429 (2007)
(suggesting a new judicial supervisory approach for revitalizing the implied warranty of
habitability which would thereby serve as a catalyst for accelerating repairs of rental housing
and thereby make them more habitable). But see THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
187
188
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complicated further by the fact that, to protest against what have
become substandard living conditions in these once rehabilitated
buildings, many of the tenants-captives have simply stopped paying
their monthly rents.196 The City plans to protect these low-income
tenants by foreclosing on approximately ten of these distressed
properties.197 The tenants would be protected under these forced
sales because all pre-existing municipal regulations, such as rent
stabilization, would continue.198
C. Subjectivity in Determining Just Compensation
Currently, just compensation for the taking of one‘s property
through eminent domain is the fair market value of that
property.199 However, this approach has been criticized for its
rigidity and the inequitable consequences imposed on the
homeowner.200 Compensating someone only through payment of the
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 728, 732–35 (2007). Only four states have failed to
recognize an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies and Professor Merrill
and Professor Smith acknowledge the continuing debate regarding whether a mandated
implied warranty of habitability improves the welfare of low-income tenants or whether it is
negligible. Id. Yet, when a tenant ―changes the condition‖ of property, waste is committed.
Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and The Doctrine of Waste in American
Property Law, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1055, 1091 (2011). Posner cautions, however, that not every
change in the condition of property may be classified as waste. POSNER, supra note 13, § 3.11.
196 Buckley, supra note 191, at A18.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent
Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 923, 939 (2006)
(criticizing the fair market value approach ―as the quite limiting default rule for
constitutionally mandated compensation.‖). In order to protect against excessive uses of their
taking powers, government entities should be held to some form of heightened scrutiny under
the Due Process Clause—possibly by use of pre-condemnation hearings. D. Zachary Hudson,
Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1306–11, 1320–21 (2010). However, this
approach is problematic because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to fully define the legal
rights of property owners facing eminent domain actions by local, state, or federal authorities.
Id. at 1286. Under the Supreme Court‘s 1985 holding in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, in order for a property owner to pursue
compensation under a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the federal courts, he must first
pursue his claim for compensation through state procedures. Williamson Cnty. Reg‘l
Planning Comm‘n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). In order to expedite claims of
this nature, it has been urged that the ―federal courts [should] resume their obligation to
adjudicate property rights claims.‖ J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of
Williamson County’s Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to NonTakings Claims, 41 URB. LAW. 615, 651 (2009). Another approach to limiting the abuse of
eminent domain powers would be the revival of the necessity doctrine which holds the
necessity or expediency of a taking under eminent domain powers is a legislative
determination and not subject to judicial review. Robert C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in
Eminent Domain, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 239, 243, 256 (2010).
200 John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783,
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fair market value of the property taken fails to take into account
any amount of subjective value that a particular homeowner has
attached to the land.201 The fair market value approach, it has been
argued, ―fail[s] to differentiate between what money could buy and
what it could not buy.‖202 One suggestion has been to compensate
the homeowner an additional percentage of the fair market value
based on how long they have lived in a home.203 Another approach
would be to undertake an objective consideration of what amount
would need to be paid to the homeowner in order to make them feel
―whole.‖204
While it is beyond the scope of this article to make a conclusion as
to the appropriate method of just compensation, it is worth noting
that there is considerable debate on this issue.205 Understanding
the fact that it is still unresolved in terms of what role subjectivity
should play in the calculation of just compensation provides the
necessary gloss for the inquiry into the compensatory efficacy of a
method for dealing with relocation in lieu of eminent domain
proceedings. Given this discussion, another shortcoming of the
Uniform Relocation Act is that it lacks any recognition of the
subjective values attached by homeowners to their homes.206 The
fact that the Riedis have lived in their apartment for over forty
years has no bearing on how much they are to be compensated.207
Thus, the failure of the federal approach to provide for sentimental
and other subjective attachments that the economic captive may
have to their home amounts to another criticism of the program.

790 (2006) (―Because just compensation law generally undervalues the home, it does not
adequately deter government from using eminent domain against homes.‖).
201 Id. at 790–91.
202 Kelly, supra note 199, at 989.
203 See Fee, supra note 200, at 818 (providing a model statute in which a ―personal
detachment award‖ is calculated based on how long a person has lived in the house, allowing
for greater compensation the longer one has lived in a house).
204 Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
239, 274 (2007) (relying on ―the considered judgments of others about what makes a person
whole.‖).
205 CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 128, at 305–06. The current fair market
value method of compensation does not take subjective values into account, but that some
states provide for compensation to include more than 100% of the fair market value of the
property. Id. The debate over just compensation has intensified in the wake of expanding
notions regarding the public use. Id. at 305.
206 See Grynbaum, supra note 1, at A20.
207 Id. at A17. Ann Riedi best expressed this concern when she said, ―‗[h]ow do you take
the memories?‘‖ Id. at A20.
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D. Managed Growth and Bonus Zoning
Managed growth is a mechanism through which local
governments seek to effectuate a greater quality of life and
sustainability through the harmonious commingling of residential,
commercial, and conservative goals.208 Maryland‘s ―Smart Growth‖
initiative embodies the principles and values that are accomplished
in an ideal implementation of managed growth.209 Under such an
initiative, communities should be designed in a ―compact, mixeduse, walkable design consistent with existing community character
and located near available or planned transit options.‖210 Further,
specific attention is given to transportation211 and the provision of
housing to people of mixed ages and incomes.212 At the heart of
managed growth is a desire to maximize the economic development
of localities.213 A managed or ―smart‖ design for population and
business distribution would provide ―employment opportunities for
all income levels within the capacity of the State‘s natural
resources, public services, and public facilities.‖214
Though many municipal layouts are already entrenched, bonus
zoning will allow the government to reshape the area over time to
achieve the desired layout consistent with the goals of managed
growth.215 Under such an approach, the municipality, in exchange
for granting a permit to a developer, could require certain actions on
the part of the developer for the betterment of the community at
large.216 While such an approach has been viewed with disfavor in
some states, many others view this type of agreement favorably
because ―it provides flexibility to deal with unanticipated
problems.‖217 Massachusetts, for example, has found ―that the

MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1.01(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
See id.; but see Lisa Rein, Study Calls Md. Smart Growth a Flop, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2009, at B1 (regarding claims that Maryland‘s smart growth has largely been unsuccessful
―because it has no teeth to force local governments to comply and because builders have little
incentive to redevelop older urban neighborhoods‖).
210 LAND USE § 1.01(4).
This type of community design is intended to be an efficient
utilization of local resources while maintaining a consistency with the locale‘s socioeconomic
and natural character. Id.
211 Id. § 1.01(6) (citing the goal of creating ―a well-maintained, multimodal transportation
system [that] facilitates the safe, convenient, affordable, and efficient movement of people‖).
212 Id. § 1.01(7).
213 See id. § 1.01.
214 Id. § 1.01(8).
215 See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261–b (McKinney 2011).
216 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
CONTROL LAW 195 (1998).
217 Id. at 196.
208
209
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voluntary offer of public benefits beyond what might be necessary to
mitigate the development of a parcel of land does not, standing
alone, invalidate a legislative act.‖218 The merits of bonus zoning lie
in the flexibility and collaborative nature inherent in its utilization.
The implementation of managed growth intermingled with bonus
zoning should be very seriously considered—especially with respect
to dealing with the issue of economic captivity. Instituting an early
plan with respect to population distribution—as is the goal of
managed growth219—could be very effective in limiting the
imposition of hardship on the economic captive. This foresight can
be seen as a pre-litigation bargain in which transactional costs are
minimized.220
This ―Coasean‖ efficiency benefits society by
preempting costly litigation in light of government efforts to
confront the reality of economic captivity from an early stage.221
Additionally, through bonus zoning, there can be some cost-shifting
from the government onto private entities in which they receive
favorable zoning in exchange for providing for appropriate facilities
for the economic captive in accordance with the affordable housing
mandates of the managed growth initiative. Importantly, the endgame of managed growth and bonus zoning is economic
maximization.222 Managed growth achieves this end-game while
also giving consideration to the ―fair share‖ requirement and
notions of social justice.223
Collaboration between public and private entities is inevitable
under this system.224 However, such an approach, in isolation, is
not without its shortcomings.
Managed growth may be
impracticable in certain areas—most likely in places with very high
218 Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Mass. 2003) (upholding an
agreement between a municipality and a developer whereby the developer would provide $8
million to the town‘s general fund in exchange for a rezoning favorable to the developer).
219 See Jerome G. Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved
Issues, 6 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 694, 698 (1975).
220 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8, 13, 15–16 (1960).
221 See id. at 17–18.
222 See discussion supra note 213 and accompanying text.
223 See supra Part IV. (The court in Mount Laurel I, held that municipalities are required
to provide affordable housing in proportion to their fair share of various demographic groups).
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (1975).
224 See Steven P. Frank, Yes in My Backyard: Developers, Government and Communities
Working Together Through Development Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42
IND. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2009) (noting that managed growth decision making involves direct
negotiations between municipalities and developers); but cf. Braham Boyce Ketcham, The
Alexandrian Planning Process: An Alternative to Traditional Zoning and Smart Growth, 41
URB. LAW. 339, 354 (2009) (commenting that managed growth, described as an imposition of
―order from above,‖ is not guaranteed to feature cooperation as developers have to
independently decide to invest in such a project).
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preexisting population densities—where changing the population
distribution would require such an overhaul of the current
distribution that creation of a managed growth area is
unrealistic.225 Further, little consideration is given to whatever
subjective values the economic captives may have attached to their
homes before they have been moved to the managed growth area.226
Overall though, there is much to say about the efficacy of such a
design, especially when addressing the question of what to do with
the economic captive.
E. Utilizing Grandfathering and Amortization
Grandfather clauses are legislative mechanisms whereby a
temporary right to continue an activity is granted even though that
activity has been deemed to be inappropriate in a given locale.227
This proposition reinforces the notion that a landowner has a vested
right to continue with a certain use of his land even after that use
has been deemed non-conforming.228 Similar to a grandfather
clause, an amortization provision allows for a now non-conforming
use to be continued in an area where it was previously allowed.229
Amortization, however, requires that the non-conforming use be
eliminated within a specified period of time.230 The length of such a
period is determined based on the nature of the use and the
economic-backed expectations of the landowner.231 The goal is to
strike a balance between ―the relative importance to be given to the
public gain and to the private loss.‖232 The fulcrum of this balancing
test must be economic considerations.
The options that these two mechanisms provide with respect to
economic captives are to either grandfather in economic captives so
that they cannot be forced to leave their property for the duration of
their lifetime, or alternatively provide for an amortization grace
period of substantially reasonable length of time so as to mitigate
the harm to the economic captive. In order to effectuate the
225 Rein, supra note 209, at B1 (citing a study saying that ―smart growth has not made a
dent in Maryland‘s war on sprawl.‖).
226 See supra Part VI (examining the debate over what is just compensation).
227 See Wisc. Wine & Spirit Inst. v. Ley, 416 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a grandfather clause is valid so long as it has a rational basis).
228 Whaley v. Dorchester Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 524 S.E.2d 404, 410 (S.C. 1999)
(Toal, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
229 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 216, at 158.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 158–59.
232 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
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economic progression of society,233 an amortization period makes
more sense as it creates a firm deadline for when the economic
captives must relocate. Predictability is achieved. Amortization
also serves as an acknowledgment that some credence should be
given to the subject values attached to the home.234 Allowing for
economic captives to remain in their homes for a certain period of
time allows for a transition period, which lessens the harshness of
forcing them to leave their home. One potential setback of such an
approach is that the rigidity of an amortization period—the
inability to remove a non-conforming use for an expressed period of
time—could stunt economic growth and prevent the achievement of
a municipality‘s maximum potential. This concern is relieved by
the determination of the reasonableness of the amortization period.
Balancing the public versus private considerations will yield an
amortization period that will neither severely hinder the needs of
the locality nor impose too harsh of a burden on the economic
captive as the reasonable period of time still provides for the
achievement of the locality‘s goals while providing economic
captives with adequate time to adapt and relocate.
As a
complement to managed growth and bonus zoning, the utilization of
an amortization period provides the necessary buffer for the
implementation of a system whereby economic maximization is
achieved without marginalizing the economic captive.
VII. CONCLUSION
That there are low-income people in modern society is a
socioeconomic reality that cannot be avoided.235 As a member of
this segment of society, an individual is essentially required to live
in a certain area due to geographic proximity to employment
opportunities and the availability of affordable housing, among
other reasons.236 To date, this status provides no added legal
significance with respect to nuisance law. When an economic
captive is forced to relocate to an area where he is then subjected to
a nuisance-like activity as a result of either eminent domain
233 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that the desired goal of the law is to further the
economic advancement of society).
234 See discussion supra Part VI.
235 See Fernandez, supra note 9, at A26. Of the hundreds of thousands of people living in
public housing, many have to endure ―crime, poverty, vandalism and poor maintenance [that]
contribute[s] to a sense of decay or indifference.‖ Id.
236 See generally, supra Part VI (commenting that economic captives are forced to live in
certain areas based on the necessities their socioeconomic status imposes upon them).
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proceedings or socioeconomic necessity, his status does not
currently factor into the traditional nuisance calculus. Although
―coming to the nuisance‖ is not a per se bar against a nuisance
claim, it is a factor that can weigh against an economic captive
plaintiff. As such, weight should also be given to the fact that the
plaintiff is an economic captive with limited housing choices.
An examination into the efficacy of a variety of approaches with
respect to what to do with the economic captive in the event that
they are displaced leads to the conclusion that the economic captive
status should be given consideration as part of the requisite
balancing test of nuisance actions.237 Employing the principles of
managed growth238 and bonus zoning,239 with an assist from the
utilization of amortization periods,240 proves to be the most
efficacious means by which to relocate economic captives and
thereby recognize their legal statuses as such, while minimizing
potential conflicts in the form of nuisance actions as they will be
relocated to areas in which their presence is compatible with the
overall layout of the area. Managed growth provides affordable
housing for the economic captive in a planned location, with close
proximity
to
sufficient
transportation
and
employment
opportunities. Bonus zoning puts the burden on municipalities to
bear the entire cost of creating these new managed communities.
Furthermore, amortization periods allow for a transition period for
the economic captives to be relocated while also acknowledging that
some subjective value should be attached to one‘s home.
This proposed method for relocating the economic captive into a
more desirable location seeks to minimize the number of nuisance
actions brought by the economic captive, thereby minimizing
transaction costs.241 By making way for a transition of the economic
captive into a more desirable location, which would reduce the
amount of nuisance-like activity that the economic captive would be
subjected to, there is an implicit acknowledgment that attention
should be given to one‘s status as an economic captive. Because the
fact that a plaintiff has come to the alleged nuisance is but one
237 Supra Part II.A. (explaining that in a nuisance action, it is the duty of the courts to
balance the utility of the good versus the gravity of the harm in order to resolve the dispute).
Economics serves as the inherent fulcrum upon which the balance of two competing uses
should be placed. Smith, supra note 4, at 699; MANDLKER, supra note 6, § 4.12.
238 See supra Part VI.D.
239 See supra Part VI.D.
240 See supra Part VI.E.
241 Coase, supra note 220 (noting that such a position is optimal for society and will best
serve the common good).
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factor that is considered in the modern ad hoc nuisance inquiry,242
the possibility that weight will be given to economic captivity status
is not foreclosed. The economic utility of the managed growth
amalgamation reinforces the position that a plaintiff required to live
in a certain location as a result of their socioeconomic status should
be taken into consideration as a counter to the ―coming to the
nuisance‖ defense. Accordingly, this will reduce the transactional
costs of nuisance actions while providing for an equitable relocation
of economic captives that will satisfy their needs.
Socioeconomic status is unquestionably a factor if indeed not a
decisive determinant, in choosing a place to live. As shown, those
with limited financial reserves and low income are usually
restricted to housing opportunities which are often deficient in
public services and are located in unsafe and unsanitary
neighborhoods where standards of habitability are severely lower if
not jeopardized entirely.243 The social costs expended in either
maintaining sub-standard housing units in blighted communities or
relocating inhabitants in these neighborhoods to better
accommodations are staggering.244
In situations, for example, where neither municipal, state nor
federal relocations are feasible economically, the ―captive‖ residents
in these substandard living accommodations should not be seen as
waiving their legal rights to unreasonable interferences with their
use and enjoyment of their real property interests. In truth, they
have been forced to come to the nuisance(s) as economic captives. A
common or basic sense of decency and humanity should impose a
legally enforceable responsibility to provide services that are
deemed necessary for an acceptable standard of living or
habitation.245
Rather than continue to abuse eminent domain powers and
condemn ―blighted‖ sub-standard housing (developments) or
neighborhoods in order to promote economic development, it would
be more equitable to rehabilitate the areas, as both the District of
Columbia246 and New York City247 are doing and, thereby,
revalidate the law of nuisance; for, ―the power to abate a nuisance,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1987).
See Zulack, supra note 197; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195.
244 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Lawson, supra note 180; Schragger,
supra note 188; Poindexter, supra note 185; Buckley, supra note 189; Fears, supra note 181.
245 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195.
246 See Lawson, supra note 180; Fears, supra note 181.
247 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713; Schragger, supra note 188; Poindexter, supra note
185; Zulack, supra note 195; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 195; Buckley, supra note 189.
242
243
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require[s] no compensation.‖248 In today‘s society, there is, most
assuredly, a place for a theory of economic captivity to be recognized
within the law of nuisance. Acceptance of this theory of necessity,
assures a re-conceptualization—and thus allows for a
reinterpretation—of the undergirding economic policies that drive
the whole of economic jurisprudence and thus impact directly
nuisance law. Acknowledging that this theory of economic captivity
is not only efficacious but normative and sound economically, will
prompt—hopefully—a new consideration if not a direct effort, which
will seek to balance efficiency and wealth maximization with (social)
fairness and not treat these values as antithetical vectors of force.249

248
249

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 519 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 31.

